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CASE NOTES
Corporations-Insider Liability--Common Law Fiduciary Principles Applied in Holding Directors Liable to Corporation for Profits from Corporate Stock Sales Made Because of Inside Information.-Defendants

Oreamuno and Gonzales were directors of Management Inc. (MAI), a New York
corporation whose stock was traded over the counter. In August 1966 the earn2
ings of MAI severely declined' from their July 1966 and August 1965 levels,
but this information was not disclosed publicly until October 1966. In September
19663 Oreamuno sold 28,500 shares and Gonzales sold 28,000 shares of 'AI

stock. 4 Plaintiff, a shareholder, brought the present derivative action, seeking an
accounting by Oreamuno and Gonzales for profits made on the sale of such
stock. 5 In denying a motion to dismiss the complaint, the appellate division held
that directors who use inside information to make profits in transactions with
corporate stock are required to account to the corporation for such profits.0 The
1. MAI was engaged in the leasing of used punch card equipment. As part of its leasing
arrangements IAI undertook to maintain and service such equipment. In order to meet this
obligation MAI entered into servicing agreements with International Business Machines Corporation (IBM). In August 1966 IBM increased its rates for the servicing and maintenance
of such equipment. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 286 n2, 287 N.Y.S2d 300,
302 n.2, motion for leave to appeal granted, 29 App. Div. 2d 1053 (Ist Dep't 1968).
2. The earnings of MAI during relevant months were: August 1966-$66,233; July 1966$262,253; August 1965-$114,048. Id. at 286, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
3. During September 1966 the bid price of the stock ranged between a high of $28.87%
and a low of $23.75 per share. After the release of August earnings the bid price fell to $11.00
per share. Id.
4. Control of the corporation was not affected by these sales. Id. at 287, 287 N.Y.S.2d at
302.
5. The action was based on the common law of New York and not the federal security
law. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions based on the latter. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1964); see American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295 N.Y. 36, 64 N.E.2d 347 (1965).
The requested relief would have been unavailable under federal law, had the suit been commenced in a district court. The relevant provision of federal law, the Security Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 US.C. § 78j(b) (1964), and SEC rule lob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (1968),
have been interpreted as providing recovery for those persons who have dealt with an insider
who either misrepresented or failed to disclose material facts. See Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). Section 16(b)
of the Security Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964), sets up an objective standard whereby an insider is held liable to the corporation for profits on any purchase and sale
within six months regardless of misrepresentation or failure to disdose material facts. The
instant case does not involve a purchase and sale within six months. The applicability of
federal law is also restricted so as not to encompass many over-the-counter transactions and
private sales of close corporation stocks. See Security Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10(b), 12,
16(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 781, 78p(b) (1964).
6. Defendant's motion for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals has been
granted with certification of the following question of law: "Whether a corporation has a
cause of action against a director who sells a portion of his own stock in the corporation
to a third person relying upon information known by him by virtue of his office but not
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court reasoned that the directors, as fiduciaries of the corporation, breached
their duty because they had "converted into money to their own use something
belonging not to them but to their corporation-inside information." 7 This was
so even though no harm resulted to the corporation by the sale, and even though
the directors sold only a small percentage of their stock. Diamond v. Oreamuno,
29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300, motion for leave to appeal granted, 29
App. Div. 2d 1053 (1st Dep't 1968).
The court's application of fiduciary principles to hold directors liable for
profits made by trading in corporate stock, with knowledge of inside information,
is unique in both its reasoning and conclusion. 8 The principle that directors are
fiduciaries of their corporations is amply supported by New York case law.0 Its
application, however, has always been in holding directors liable for making personal profits from transactions entered into or which should have been entered
into on behalf of the corporation,10 taking advantage of corporate opportunities," diverting corporate assets,' 2 competing with the corporation,"8 or making
disclosed publicly, where the corporation sustained no loss or damage, and where there was
no usurpation or diversion of a corporate or business opportunity." Appellant's Memorandum
of Law in Support of Motion for Order Granting Leave to Appeal at Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 1053 (1st Dep't 1968).

7. 29 App. Div. 2d at 288, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 304 (citation omitted).
8. Although the court pointed out that § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964), has been
described as a statutory adaptation of common law permitting such an application of fiduciary principles, 29 App. Div. 2d at 289 nA, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 304-05 n.4, it appears that no
common law judicial authority existed for such an application. See text accompanying notes
17-20 infra.

9. Equity Corp. v. Groves, 294 N.Y. 8, 60 N.E.2d 19 (1949); Pink v. Title Guar. & Trust
Co., 274 N.Y. 167, 8 N.E.2d 321 (1937); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y.
185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912);
McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899); Winter v. Anderson, 242 App. Div. 430,
275 N.Y.S. 373 (4th Dep't 1934).
10. E.g., New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102
(1926); Van Cott v. Van Brunt, 82 N.Y. 535 (1880); Turner v. American Metal Co., 268
App. Div. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 295 N.Y. 822, 66 N.E.2d
591 (1946); Frank Sheridan Jonas, Inc. v. Romanat, 94 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aft'd,
278 App. Div. 809, 104 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 303 N.Y. 616, 101
N.E.2d 487 (1951); Hauben v. Morris, 161 Misc. 174, 291 N.Y.S. 96 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Stanton v. Schenck, 142 Misc. 406, 252 N.Y.S. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
11. E.g., Goth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'g 23 Del. Ch.
138, 2 A.2d 225 (Ch. 1938); Black v. Parker Mfg. Co., 329 Mass. 105, 106 N.E.2d 544 (1952);
BIaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Trans. Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1st Dep't
1941), aft'd, 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944); Kelly v. 74 & 76 W. Tremont Ave.
Corp., 4 Misc. 2d 533, 151 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Manacher v. Central Coal Co.,
63 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
12. E.g., Everett v. Philips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942); Marian v. Marian, 84
N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 276 App. Div. 205, 93 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1st Dep't 1949).
13. E.g., Stalkot Importing Corp. v. Berlin, 295 N.Y. 482, 68 N.E.2d S01 (1946); Foley v.
D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dep't 1964); Duane Jones Co. v.
Burke, 281 App. Div. 622, 121 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1st Dep't 1953), modified, 306 N.Y. 172, 117
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extra profits when selling control of the corporation. 14 Further, in each case
where a director has been held liable to the corporation on fiduciary grounds,
there existed damage to the corporation, an element not present here.
The only holding similar to the instant one was that of a Delaware court in
Brophy v. Cities Service Co.15 Certain significant facts, however, distinguish the
two cases. In Brophy, the corporation was planning a tender offer for a substantial number of its shares. A confidential secretary to one of its directors, realizing that in order for the tender offer to be successful it would have to be made at
a price higher than the market price, bought and sold at a profit a small block
of shares. In a stockholders' derivative suit brought to require an accounting by
him to the corporation for such profits, the court said that loss to the corporation
was not a necessary element in order to find liability for a breach of fiduciary
duty. It is obvious, however, that his acquisition of the stock was in competition
with the corporation's plans to acquire stock, and thus, in effect, his liability was
based not on the use of inside information, but rather on his competition with
the corporation in its acquisition of corporate stock. It is also possible that the
case could be properly classified with those which have held directors liable for
making personal profits out of6 transactions which should have been entered into
on behalf of the corporation.'
The present court's prime authorities for its holding are Seavey on Agency,
and the Restatement (Second) of Agency. In section 148(B), Seavey stated that
an agent is under a duty to account for profits made through the use of information acquired by him because of his position. He supported this contention by
citing two cases. The first case 17 concerned an agent who, while negotiating for
his principal for the purchase of certain mineral rights, learned of similar rights
nearby and bought them for himself. The second case' 8 involved directors who
caused the corporation to issue them treasury stock for an amount allegedly less
than its value without giving other stockholders an opportunity to bid on or
purchase such stock. It is obvious that in each of these situations there was harm
to the principal, though in the latter case the court stated in dictum that it was
immaterial whether or not the corporation was damaged. It is questionable, however, whether in the absence of loss to the principal the court would have imposed liability.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency states:
An agent who acquires confidential information in the course of his employment
or in violation of his duties has a duty not to use it to the disadvantage of the
principal .... He also has a duty to account for any profits made by the use of
such information, although this does not harm the principal . . . . So, if he has
"inside" information that the corporation is about to purchase or sell securities,
N.E2d 237 (1954); Singer v. Carlisle, 26 N.YS.2d 172 (Sup. CL 1940), affd, 261 App. Div.
897, 26 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep't 1941).
14. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
15.

31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949).

16. See cases cited note 10 supra.
17. Nye v. Lovelace, 228 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1956).
18. Johnson v. Duensing, 340 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. CL App. 1960).
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or to declare or to pass a dividend, profits made by him in stock transactions undertaken because of his knowledge are held in constructive trust for the principal. He
is also liable for profits made by selling confidential information to third persons,
even though the principal is not adversely affected. 19
The cases annotated to this section 20 deal with instances where an agent took
advantage of an opportunity which belonged to his principal, thereby harming
the principal. Thus, these cases too offer no authority for the present holding.
The instant court stated that "[t]hese fiduciaries are not being charged because they sold stock, or because transactions in securities might subvert their
proper functioning as executives of MAI or blemish its reputation. They are
being charged because they converted into money to their own use something belonging not to them but to their corporation-inside information."' Perhaps by
implying in this statement that inside information is a corporate asset, the court
was trying to gain support for its decision from those cases which have held
directors liable for diverting corporate assets.2 2 Inside information, however,
has generally not been considered an asset of the corporation.23 It should also
be noted that the corporation had no way to make use of the inside information.
It would have been illegal for the corporation to sell this information, or for it
to issue its treasury stock or its authorized but unissued stock, without disclosing
it. 24
If the decision is to be accepted as based only on public policy grounds, it
may be questioned whether the public needs such extensive protection. Federal
security law, arguably, already provides adequate protection to one who transacts with an insider who fails to disclose material information. 2 5 Indeed, this
decision would subject the directors to a hazard of double recovery 20 in that they
would be required to account to the corporation under this case, and then might
also be held liable under section 10b-527 to those persons who purchased their
shares. It would also provide a new class of stockholder's derivative suits with
which dissident stockholders could harass corporate directors. Conceivably,
19. Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 388, comment c at 204-05 (1958).
20. Id. at appendix § 388 (1957).
21. 29 App. Div. 2d at 288, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04.
22. Supra note 12.
23. "[Klnowledge of a general sort or information gained through being a director or
officer is generally not considered as a corporate facility the use of which for his own profit
may make the corporate official accountable to the corporation." Annot., 153 A.L.R. 663,
668 (1944) citing Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 14 N.W.2d 913 (1944); Young v.
Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (1931).
24. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.Ind. 1966); see Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 500 (1966).
25. See supra note 5. Of course, should Congress deem more extensive protection necessary,
it is free to add appropriate statutory liability. Obviously, liability to a corporation offers
both preventative and remedial protection to the purchaser of the corporation's stock from
an insider.
26. The instant court specifically declined to rule on this issue. 29 App. Div. 2d at 290,
287 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
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whenever a director engaged in transactions in corporate stock some stockholder
could allege that the director used inside information. As a result directors may
no longer want to trade in corporate stock,
thereby removing a valuable incen28
tive for becoming a corporate director.
This decision also presents a problem in the computation of damages. A director violating his fiduciary duty would normally have to hold what he made in
constructive trust for the corporation. The usual measure of the director's profit
is the difference between the sale price and the cost of the shares. This measure
of damages, however, is not applicable here. Instead, the court must attempt to
find the loss prevented by the use of inside information. This amount could be
computed in several ways. It could be the difference between the price at which
he had sold the stock and the price to which it declined when the news was disclosed; or, it could be the difference between the price at which he had sold it,
and the lowest price to which it declined as a result of the disclosure. Yet a third
measure could be the difference between his selling price and the price to which
it declined within a reasonable time after the news was disclosed. A reasonable
time might be such length 6f time as it would take a reasonably diligent investor
to discover the information. The last alternative is probably the most equitable
since there should be no objections to directors selling their stock after the news
has been disclosed to all interested parties.
However equitably damages might be assessed, the instant holding reflects an
unfortunate exercise of judicial creativity. Rendered at a time when the scope
of insider liability under existing statutes and agency rulings is at best in a state
of flux, the instant decision merely offers the corporate insider greater uncertainty. The court has imposed what amounts to a penalty upon corporate insiders
by finding a new common law liability to an undamaged entity for acts which
existing law, to the extent deemed wise by legislatures, has already provided
redress for those actually injured.

Criminal Law-Plain Error Rule--Standards for Application of the

Rule Set Forth.-Defendant was convicted of carrying on the business of distilling without posting a bond.' Thereafter, defendant moved to set bail pending

his appeal, claiming that he should be released on bail because the judge's
instructions to the jury, to which he had not objected at trial, contained error

so plain that he would win on appeal. Applying Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 30 and 52(b), the court declared the appeal frivolous and denied the
motion. United States v. Summerour, 279 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Mich. 1968).

Federal Rule 52(b), entitled "plain error," provides: "Plain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to
28. It is possible nevertheless, for standards to be set up which would delineate when it
would be proper for a director to deal in the stock of the corporation. See 37 Fordharn L.
Rev. 483, 492 (1968).
1. 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a) (4) (1964).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 7

the attention of the court." The instant court noted that the rule itself is quite
unclear, as it contains no real definition of "plain error" except by references to
the nebulous term "substantial rights."2 Any definition, then, of "plain error,"
and how it is to be applied, must come from case law. The court here tried to
bring together the various conclusions on the subject and then to present a set
of workable rules.
Judicial reaction to "plain error" motions was epitomized by the First Circuit
in Dichner v. United States.8 The court stated: "It is also unfair to the court
and the public generally if a defendant can have two bites at the cherry by
saying nothing and then coming back and asking for a second chance." 4
While most courts agree that "plain error" is to be applied only in exceptional
cases, no single norm of exceptionality appears to exist. The First Circuit would
apply the "plain error rule" only if the error had been of "great magnitude, ' 3
meaning errors which "'seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' "6 The Sixth Circuit describes "plain error" as an
"obvious miscarriage of justice." 7 Finding a judge so incompetent as to fit the
Eighth Circuit's description seems impossible. He would have to have given
instructions that were "so indefinite, uncertain, contradictory, misleading, inconsistent and prejudicial as to require reversal on review."8
Rule 30 adds to the problems created by the definitional inadequacies surrounding plain error. It states, in part: "No party may assign as error any portion of the charge . . . unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and his grounds
of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the
hearing of the jury and, on request of any party out of presence of this jury."
This rule would appear to be in direct conflict with rule 52 (b) (the plain error
rule). While rule 30 would deny the appeal counsel the privilege of performing
a post-mortem on the instructions, in order to bring up new objections, rule 52
(b) allows the court to notice previously unobjected to "plain errors."
The instant court has read these two rules together in order to construct a
pattern to follow in deciding when to apply rule 30 and when to apply rule 52
(b). It termed plain error "a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done."' 0 It asked
"what, in legal contemplation, is 'fundamental'?"" 1 The court first turned to
the content of the instructions themselves. It divided them into two general
2. 279 F. Supp. at 409.
3. 348 F.2d 167 (1st Cir. 1965).
4. Id. at 168.
5. Id.
6. Lash v. United States, 221 F.2d 237,
7. United States v. Ramsey, 291 F.2d
(1961).
8. Cave v. United States, 159 F.2d 464,
9. See Lash v. United States, 221 F.2d
10. 279 F. Supp. at 410.
11. Id.

240 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 826 (1955).
737, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899
466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 US. 847 (1947).
237 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 826 (1955).
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parts: (1) the basic charge, and (2) the minutiae of the particular case. The
basic charges are those which are common to each and every criminal trial.
These entail two factors: (a) an explanation of the elements of the offense
charged and, (b) the concepts involved in due process (e.g., reasonable doubt,
burden of proof, and presumption of innocence). Any instructions concerned
with either (a) or (b) are deemed "fundamental." This is the part of the instructions which definitely affects the "substantial rights" mentioned in rule
52(b). A mistake or an omission in these "basic" charges is clear grounds for
a reversal on "plain error" grounds.
The second part, the "minutiae," are those instructions which are peculiar
to the facts of the given case. These are concerned with "the evidence adduced
and the procedures followed in this particular trial."12 The general rule is that
"an instruction that needs to be related to the facts at bar in order to be
proper, is not a 'fundamental' one."' 3 Rule 30 applies to this type of special
charge. If the trial counsel did not object when such specific instructions were
being given, then "plain error" cannot be asserted on appeal. The purpose of
rule 30 is to invite counsel to aid the judge in formulating this part of his
charge14 and to keep defense counsel from remaining silent during special
charges, waiting for the judge to slip, knowing that "plain error" can be raised
on appeal. "The Rules generally are designed to prevent counsel from holding
his cards close to his vest."15
Although this decision binds but one district court, it appears that it goes far
to set a definitional guideline concerning "plain error." Such a guideline might
well be adopted in other districts.

Securities Regulation-Rule 10b-5 Concepts of Materiality and Duty of
Disclosure Expanded.-On November 8, 1963, as part of exploratory operations started in 1957 in eastern Canada, the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company
(TGS) drilled test hole K55-1. A visual inspection on November 12 of the core
so extracted disclosed an unusually high content of copper and zinc, and convinced TGS that it would be desirable to acquire the surrounding property.
In order to do this as inexpensively as possible, drilling operations were discontinued and the president of TGS instructed the exploratory group' to keep
the drilling results secret even as to other officers, directors and employees of
TGS. In early December, a chemical assay of the core confirmed that the copper
12.

Id.

13. Benatar v. United States, 209 F2d 734, 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974
(1954).
14. 279 F. Supp. at 411.
15. Benatar v. United States, 209 Fa2d 734, 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974
(1954).
1. The exploratory group included defendants Mullinson, a Vice President of TGS, Holyk,
TGS' Chief Geologist, Clayton, a geophysicist, and Darke, a geologist.
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and zinc content was unusually good and also disclosed a substantial content of
silver. By March 27, 1964, TGS decided that the land acquisition program
had reached a point where drilling could be continued. Between March 31 and
April 10, four additional holes were drilled and inspection of the cores revealed
a substantial mineral content in each. Meanwhile, rumors of a major ore discovery were circulating throughout Canada and they appeared in the New York
papers on April 11. In an effort to quell these rumors, TGS, on April 12, issued
a press release which admitted that it was exploring, but stated that the rumors
exaggerated the scale of operations and concluded that "any statement as to
size and grade of ore would be premature and possibly misleading." 2 Between
April 12 and April 16, three more drill holes were completed and examination
of their cores disclosed substantial mineral content. On April 16, TGS issued a
release which announced a major ore discovery.
During the period from November 12, 1963 to April 12, 1964, three officers
and five employees of TGS purchased or recommended that others purchase
TGS stock or calls thereon. Between the first press release on April 12 and the
dissemination of the TGS official announcement on the morning of April 16, the
secretary of TGS and an employee purchased TGS stock. Moreover, during the
press conference on April 16, one director left the room and made a telephone
call to his broker which resulted in purchases of TGS securities by third parties.
Furthermore, on February 20, some of the defendants accepted stock options
from a company committee which had not been informed of the drilling results.
The SEC commenced proceedings charging that by purchasing or recommending the purchase of TGS securities on the basis of material inside information
which had not been released to the public and by accepting the stock options,
the defendants had violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19343 and rule 10b-5 4 promulgated thereunder. The Commission also claimed
that the press release of April 12 was false and misleading.
The district court held that the transactions in TGS securities prior to April
9, 1964 were not in violation of the rule because the drilling results were not
material until then, and that only those defendants who had traded between
April 9 and April 16, had violated rule 10b-S. 5 The court also held that the press
release of April 12 was not "misleading or deceptive on the basis of the facts
then known,"8 and that even if it had been false or misleading, it did not violate
2. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1968). Rule lob-5 provides as follows: "It shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c)To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security."
5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
6. Id. at 296. The court reasoned that the framers of the press release were under con-
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the rule because it was not issued "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security. ' 7 Furthermore, the court held that the directors who alerted third
parties to the news after the release of the 16th, but before the news was
carried over the Dow Jones tape, did not violate rule 10b-5.8 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court on
the question of materiality and held that the drilling results were material from
the date of the visual inspection. Hence, the defendants who purchased or
recommended that others purchase TGS securities on the basis of this information had violated rule 10b-5.9 The appellate court also held that there must be
a reasonable waiting period after the release of the inside information before an
insider can trade,10 and that the members of top management, who with knowledge of the drilling results had accepted stock options, had violated the rule."
Finally, the court held that the press release of April 12 was issued in connection with the purchase or sale of a security- and could have been misleading, 13
remanding to the district court for proceedings to determine whether it was
misleading to the reasonable investor and whether the framers of the press
siderable pressure. If they issued too optimistic a release, they subjected the company to
possible liability if it turned out that they had not discovered a commercial mine. If they
said too little and later announced a discovery, they subjected the company to the charge
that the press release was false and misleading. The court also believed that if they had just
stated the drilling results, they would have encouraged rumors which they had hoped to
allay. There was no evidence that the drilling results after 7:00 P.4. April 10 were known
to the framers. The court found that even though the drilling results were material on
April 9, the results did not establish the existence of a commercial mine. The court held
that the release must not be judged on the basis of hindsight and that the framers had
exercised reasonable business judgment under the circumstances.
7. Id. at 293. The court, relying on Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc, (1961-1964
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,317 (NJ). Ill.,
Jan. 14, 1964), held that
"[i]n the absence of a showing that the purpose of the April 12 press release was to affect
the market price of TGS stock to the advantage of TGS or its insiders, the issuance of the
press release did not constitute a violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-S since it was not
issued 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."' 258 F. Supp. at 294.
8. Id. at 288-90. The court held that the fixing of a waiting period after announcement
of material inside information was more properly a legislative or administrative function.
9. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968).
10. Id. at 854. The mere release of material inside information is not enough to satisfy
the requirements of the rule. Insiders must, at the minimum, wait until the material information "could reasonably have been expected to appear over the media of widest circulation,
the Dow Jones broad tape .

.

. :"Id. at 854.

11. Id. at 856-57. The court held that members of top management are required, before
accepting stock options, to disclose material inside information which might affect the price
of the stock during the period in which the option could be exercised. However, in cases
where disclosure would jeopardize a corporate security, the court indicated that the better
rule would be to hold that accepting the option does not violate rule lob-S but that
exercising it without full disclosure and ratification would.
12. Id. at 858-62.
13. Id. at 862-64.
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release had exercised due diligence. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), petitionsfor cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1969)
(No. 897), 37 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1969) (No. 937).
The case was widely discussed even before it came to trial, 14 and the decision
of the court of appeals has already had a major impact on the business community.'5 Prior to the instant decision, it had been clear that rule lob-S imposed
a duty of disclosure on insiders who traded on the basis of material inside
information. 16 However, it was not clear whether this duty of disclosure would
be limited to insiders or whether it would be imposed on anyone who traded
on the basis of undisclosed, material information. There was also uncertainty
as to what facts could be termed "material." Furthermore, it had been thought
that a misleading disclosure in the absence of trading by insiders was not a
violation of rule 10b-S because it could not be considered as having been issued
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 17 The instant court's
holdings (1) as to what facts are material, (2) as to who has a duty of disclosure, and (3) as to whether the press release was issued in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security, have clarified these issues by significantly
extending the regulation of insider trading under rule 10b-5.18
14. See, e.g., Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The
Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 Va. L. Rev. 1271 (1965); Symposium
-Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. Law. 1009 (1966); Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.: The Inside and Outside of Rule 10b-5, 46 B.U.L. Rev. 205 (1966); Note, Ancillary Relief
in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule 10b-5, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 656 (1966).
15. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1968, at 54, cols. 5-6; id., Aug. 14, 1968, at 1, col. 4;
Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1968, at 1, col. 6; id., Aug. 15, 1968, at 4, col. 2; id., Aug. 14, 1968,
at 3, cols. 1-3.
16. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
17. Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
ff 91,317 (NJ). 11., Jan. 14, 1964).

18. While this discussion will be limited to the above, it should be noted that the court's
pronouncements on the elements of a cause of action under the rule and the necessity for
a waiting peirod between disclosure and trading, have provided the first judicial resolutions
to some of the practical problems arising under the rule.
The defendants who had purchased after the release of the 16th, but before the news was
deemed disclosed, claimed that they were justified in so doing because they had honestly
believed that the news had become public before they placed their orders. However, the
court stated that "whether the case . . . is treated solely as an SEC enforcement proceeding
or as a private action, proof of a specific intent to defraud is unnecessary." 401 F.2d at 854
(footnote omitted). The court based its decision as to an enforcement proceeding by the
SEC on SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), which held that
in a regulatory or enforcement proceeding brought by the SEC under § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1964), Congress intended the Act to be
flexibly construed and that it would defeat the purpose of the Act to hold "that Congress,
in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates 'as a fraud or deceit,'
intended to require proof of intent to injure and actual injury . . . ." Id. at 192. However,
in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the SEC was seeking ancillary as well as injunctive relief, and no
case prior to this had passed upon the question as to whether the SEC could request an
ancillary order that the defendants be required to make restitution to private persons. See
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Rule 10b-5 is more than a mere prohibition against manipulative or deceptive
practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. In addition to
prohibiting false statements and the omission of statements necessary to make
facts already stated not misleading, it has been interpreted to impose an
affirmative duty of disclosure where an insider remained silent in face-to-face
transactions with a stockholder.' 9 Moreover Cochran v. Clanning Corp.20 held
that a duty to disclose existed when an insider purchased on an organized exchange even though there was no communication between the parties. 21 The
present defendants argued against the holding of Cochran, contending that it
would be impossible for an insider trading on a national exchange to find the
other party to the transaction and disclose material information to him. However, as the court of appeals pointed out, public disclosure would satisfy the
duty imposed by the rule. The court, reasoning that "the Rule is based in policy
on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material inNote, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule lOb-S, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
657 (1966).
Moreover, in regard to private suits, there had been decisions in the Second Circuit which
required proof of some of the elements of comfion-law fraud. See, eg., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951) (proof of fraud is required); Weber v.
CM.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (scienter); Barnett v. Anaconda Co,
238 F. Supp. 766, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (causation). However, the court relied on recent
decisions in other circuits which held that it is only necessary to prove a material misstatement of fact or an omission to state a material fact. See, eg., Stevens v. VowelI, 343 F.2d
374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965) ; Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). The court maintained that its statements were
not irreconcilable with the previous decisions in the Second Circuit because some form of
the traditional scienter requirement was maintained. The court stated that "[this requirement, whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct, remains implicit in this standard, a standard that promotes the deterrence
objective of the Rule." 401 F.2d at 855. Thus, there need be no intent to deceive; negligent
conduct can violate the rule.
As to the waiting period requirement, see note 10 supra. It is the first judicial decision to
hold that there must be a waiting period between the release of material inside information
and trading by an insider. The SEC had previously warned insiders to stay out of the
market "until the established procedures for public release of the information are carried
out instead of hastening to execute transactions in advance of, and in frustration of, the
objectives of the release.' Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961). However, the
court of appeals has only stated the minimum waiting period required. It is possible that
insiders might be held to violate the rule whenever they trade before the news has been
absorbed by the market. This might be some time after it is carried over the Dow-Jones
tape.
19. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951), aft'd, 23S
F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
20. 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
21. Id. at 243. See also List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F2d 457, 461 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 US. 811 (1965).
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formation," 22 held that the Act and rule applied to transactions which are
location of the transaction
executed on organized exchanges.23 Clearly, 2 the
4
should not affect the applicability of the rule.
Rule lOb-5, however, does not specify the matters to be disclosed. They are
determined by the decisional law tests of materiality and inside information.
In the context of rule 10b-5, materiality has been interpreted to mean facts
which "would materially affect the judgment of the other party to the transaction." 25 Moreover, this judgment must be reasonable.20 A test more particularly
tailored to the securities market has defined material facts as those "which in
reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities, '27 but "value" remained undefined. Clearly, these
definitions supply no precise standard which can be easily applied; however,
the courts have used them to hold that information was material whenever
the equities of the situation so required.28 The district court in the instant case
had held that materiality should be determined by measuring the effect that
disclosure would have on a conservative investor 2 0 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that reasonable speculators, being reasonable men, were entitled
to the same protection as conservative investors.80 Furthermore, the court of
appeals defined material facts as those "which may affect the desire of investors
to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities." 3' Under this definition,
the value of a corporation's stock is judged not only by its earnings value but
by the market price as well. This expanded definition of materiality led the
court to reverse the district court on the question of when the drilling results
became material. In reaching the conclusion that the results were material from
the date of the first visual inspection, a major factor was the importance
attached to the drilling results by the defendants themselves. The district court
had concluded that this information had a special significance to an insider
22. 401 F.2d at 848.
23. Id.
24. Fleisher, supra note 14, at 1278. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 (1961),
which stated that: "It would be anomalous indeed if the protection afforded by the antifraud provisions were withdrawn from transactions effected on exchanges, primary markets
for securities transactions."
25. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800, modified, 83 F. Supp. 613
(ED. Pa. 1947).
26. Rogen v. Mkon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966).
27. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965) ; Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
28. See Taylor v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass. 1962), modified, 344 F.2d 781
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (potential of a failing business); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (identity of purchaser) ; Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aft'd, 235 Fad 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (deceptive inventory and nondisclosure of improved earnings); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
73 F. Supp. 798 (ED. Pa. 1947) (nondisclosure of a contract for the sale of a corporation's
assets to a third party).
29. 258 F. Supp. at 280.
30. 401 F.2d at 850.
31. Id. at 849.
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because of his professional background, and that the early guesses were not
based on material facts but were based on educated guesses which do not have
to be disclosed. 3 2 But the court of appeals, while agreeing that educated guesses
or opinions do not have to be disclosed, took a more realistic approach. In
reversing, the court reasoned that:
[Defendants] alone were in a position to evaluate the probability and magnitude of
what seemed from the outset to be a major ore strike; they alone could invest safely,
secure in the expectation that the price of TGS stock would rise substantially in the
event such a major strike should materialize, but would decline little, if at all, in the
event of failure, for the public, ignorant at the outset of the favorable probabilities
would likewise be unaware of the unproductive exploration, and the additional exploration costs would not significantly affect TGS market pricesPes
The court stretched the facts somewhat when it stated that it "seemed from the
outset to be a major ore strike.1 34 This was only a possibility. However, the
point the court made was that the possibility of a mine was a material fact.
Insiders do not have to disclose their opinions or predictions, but they do have
to disclose the facts, if they are material, upon which their opinions are based.
The possibility of a major mineral discovery is certainly a fact which might
"affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities,"
particularly if "investors" includes speculators as well as conservative investors.
However, in many cases, disclosure may hurt the corporation. In the instant
case, it would have jeopardized the corporation's land acquisition program.
Moreover, as the dissent points out, disclosure may have violated the Commission's own rule that" '[n]o claim shall be made to the existence of a body of
ore unless it has been sufficiently tested to be properly classified as "proven" or
"probable" ore .... ,35 But these objections are based on the assumption that
there are only two choices for the person with material inside information, i.e.,
either disclose it or violate the rule. The present decision has provided a third
alternative: to refrain from trading until after the information is disclosed. " 0
This holding is designed to promote an equalization of bargaining positions
between parties to securities transactions,37 but it is not certain whether it will
promote disclosure. It could have the effect of reducing everyone to the level of
the least informed. Nondisclosure will only benefit the corporation or its insiders in those areas where there is a legitimate corporate purpose for nondisclosure. Moreover, where there is no legitimate corporate purpose, insiders
may be hurt by nondisclosure. Presumably, their specialized knowledge of the
industry would enable them to better evaluate the information and thus use it
32. 258 F. Supp. at 283.
33. 401 F.2d at 852.
34. The expert witnesses all agreed that one drill core is not a sufficient basis on which
to predict a commercially profitable mine.
35. 401 F.2d at 873 (Lumbard & Moore, JJ., dissenting).
36. Id. at 848. The SEC had previously stated this rule in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907 (1961), but Texas Gulf Sulphur is the first judicial affirmance of it.
37. The most dearly stated policy set by the courts for rule 10b-S has been the equalization of bargaining positions. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 803, 828-29
(D. DeL 1951).
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more profitably. Since they cannot trade in the absence of disclosure, they
would not be able to take advantage of their educated guesses. Thus the
impetus would seem to be towards disclosure. However, the court's holding on
the press release of April 12 may have supplied a legitimate corporate purpose
for nondisclosure, i.e., the fear of possible liability for an insufficient or misleading disclosure.
It had been clear that a false or misleading press release issued for the
purpose of affecting the market price of a corporation's securities to the benefit
of the corporation or its insiders was issued in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security. 38 But in the absence of insider trading, it appeared that there
could not be a connection with the purchase or sale of a security,89 and that
there would be difficulty in proving that the release was issued for an ulterior
motive. In the instant case, the release was issued to quell the extravagant
rumors which were circulating, and there was no evidence which would have
justified a finding that the release was issued for a manipulative purpose. However, the court of appeals held that rule lOb-5 is violated whenever false or
misleading statements are made in a manner reasonably calculated to influence
the investing public, irrespective of whether they were issued for ulterior
purposes, if due diligence was not exercised in their preparation and release.40
This holding places a great burden on the corporation which the court justified
on the theory that an innocently misleading statement can injure reasonable
investors as much as one that is motivated by an ulterior purpose. The court did
not indicate whether a lack of due diligence would subject the corporation to
liability for damages, but it did not negate this possibility. The majority, however, did attempt to provide guidance to the drafters of press releases. They
indicated that a corporation should stick to the facts and avoid trying to shield
them in ambiguous statements. This could have been done in the instant case
without the publishing of a "mass of metallurgical reports" as suggested by the
dissent. 41 TGS could have published a short summary of the assays and, since
the land acquisition program had been completed by April 12th, could have
disclosed that these assays had convinced TGS that it should acquire the
surrounding property. However, such a report, if it turned out that a commercial
body of ore did not exist, might have been called too optimistic or misleading.
This possibility of liability for negligently misleading corporate statements
could well deter the dissemination of corporate information. As noted by Judge
Friendly, in his concurring opinion:
If the only choices open to a corporation are either to remain silent and let false
rumors do their work, or to make a communication, not legally required, at the risk
that a slip of the pen or failure properly to amass or weigh the facts-all judged in
the bright gleam of hindsight-will lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis
of speculators and their lawyers, most corporaby innocent investors, for the benefit
42
tions would opt for the former.
38. Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
ff 91,317 (ND. IL., Jan. 14, 1964).
39. Id.
40. 401 F2d at 862.
41. Id. at 878.
42. Id. at 867.
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As to who is subject to a duty of disclosure, rule 10b-5 prohibits "any
person" from making affirmative misstatements in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security.43 However, an affirmative duty to disclose material facts
has only been imposed on those termed "insiders." The term "insider" had not
been clearly defined. The only people definitely included within the term were
corporate officers, directors and controlling stockholders. 4 However, the SEC in
Cady, Roberts & Co.45 held that the duty of disclosure is not limited to "insiders" but is imposed on any person having "access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone ....
In Cady, Roberts the violator was a broker
and the business partner of an insider, and it was unclear whether the SEC was
imposing a special obligation on brokers, or whether the obligation would be
imposed on all having access to such information.47 The present case has left
no doubt that the SEC intended the ruling to apply to all having access to
material inside information. The decision imposed a duty of disclosure on lower
employees, i.e., an attorney, an engineer, and a geologist. The court, citing
Cady, Roberts, held that anyone who has access to material inside information
may not take advantage of it if he knows that it is unavailable to the investing
public. 48 The court also held that the defendants who gave tips to outsiders had
violated the rule and remanded to the district court for a determination of the
appropriate remedy 4 9 The court was not required to decide whether the purchases by "tippees" had violated the rule, but they indicated that such could be
violations. 50 The fact that the SEC did not attempt to establish a violation by
the "tippees" does not necessarily mean that the Commission will not, in the
future, attempt to establish such a violation. In circumstances such as those
presented here, the SEC may believe that holding the tipper liable for damage
caused by his tip is a more effective means of restricting trading on the basis
of inside information. An insider will be more reluctant to tip, if he will be held
liable for any damage resulting from the tip. Such a method is designed to stop
the leakage of material inside information at its source. The problem with this
method is that it imposes an enormous and unrealistic liability. Critics of the
decision often make the mistake of giving examples where an employee innocently discloses material information to a wealthy friend who takes advantage
of it. They argue that the imposition of liability on the employee is not only
unfair but unrealistic because the average employee could not make restitution
where his wealthy friend made substantial purchases. But there would be no
violation of the rule, under the present decision, unless the employee took
advantage of the inside information. Thus it would appear that an innocent
disclosure would not be a violation. Of course, if a director gave a tip to his
"46

43. See note 4, supra.
44. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1450 (2d ed. 1961).
45. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
46. Id. at 912 (footnote omitted).
47. See Note, Broker Silence and Rule 10b-5: Expanding the Duty to Disclose. 71
Yale L.. 736 (1962).
48. 401 F.2d at 848.
49. Id. at 852.
50. Id. at 852-53.
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broker son-in-law, even though he did not trade for his own account, it would
not be difficult for a court to find that he took advantage. However, it is true
that most employees would not be able to make restitution where their "tippees"
made substantial purchases. In such cases, the SEC might try to establish a
violation by the "tippees" albeit they have no traditional obligation to the stockholders of the corporation. However, the SEC and the court of appeals might
impose one on the basis that it would be unfair to allow them to take advantage
of the information. But in cases where a brokerage firm received a tip that the
earnings of a corporation were off, would the unfairness to the stockholders of
the corporation outweigh the brokerage firm's obligations to their clients? If
they disclosed to all of their clients would they violate the rule? Cady, Roberts
and the instant decision appear to hold that there would be a violation of the
rule, but the SEC has not supplied any arguments for such a holding, except
the fairness argument.
The holding by the court of appeals does much towards eliminating objectionable insider trading, but it may also make it impossible for insiders to trade.
While an insider will always know more about his company, or at least about
some specialized area of its activities, than an outsider, this information will
not impose a duty of disclosure, unless it is material. But what if an insider has
a doubt about its materiality? He could follow the recommendations of the
New York Stock Exchange and limit his transactions to regular periodic purchases after the distribution of fully informative annual or quarterly reports,"1
but it is not certain whether this would protect him. Moreover, in view of the
present decision, an insider will almost always have doubts. Any fact which
might affect the desire of a speculator to buy or sell is material. Under this
definition, an argument could be made that almost any fact is material. The
SEC might limit its actions to circumstances where the facts present a clear and
gross violation, but there is no reason to believe that private suitors would so
limit themselves. Private suitors, relying on the instant case, would probably
argue that the fact of the purchase proves that the information was material.
Taxation-Retention of Royalty upon Disposition of Hard Mineral Rights
Results in Ordinary Income.-Taxpayers transferred the mineral rights on
their land (excluding rights to coal, oil and gas) to the transferee for a lump
sum payment and the retention of a ten percent royalty of all minerals mined,
marketed and sold. The mineral deed did not obligate the grantee to develop the
property. The taxpayers contended that the transaction constituted a sale and
that both the lump sum payment and the royalty payments should have been
treated as capital gains for income tax purposes. The Commissioner argued that
the transaction was a lease and that both the lump sum payment and the royalties should have been treated as ordinary income subject to the percentage
depletion allowance. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the
transaction constituted a lease and that both the lump sum payment and the
royalty payments must be treated as ordinary income, subject to the depletion
allowance. In so deciding, the court overruled its prior decision1 as to the treat51. N.Y. Stock Exch., The Corporate Director and the Investing Public 12-13 (1965).
1. The same parties brought the transaction before the same court in 1962. The court
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2
ment of the lump sum payment and reversed the holding of the trial court with
respect to the royalty payments. United States v. White, 401 F.2d 610 (10th
Cir. 1968).
Whether a transfer of mineral interests is characterized as a sale or a lease is
of critical importance to the transferor-taxpayer. If the disposition is considered
a sale the taxpayer will normally be accorded capital gains treatment on the
consideration received. 3 If, on the other hand, the transaction is classified as a
lease the consideration will be treated as ordinary income for tax purposes, sub4
ject to a depletion allowance. The taxpayer will normally benefit more from
5
the case law concerning this sale-lease
capital gains treatment. Unfortunately,
8
distinction is in confusion.
Apparently there is some disparity between the tax treatment accorded transactions in the oil and gas field and that given transactions in the hard mineral
area.7 Extensive litigation in the oil and gas area has developed the "economic
interest" test 8 which, although first used to determine whether a taxpayer was

then afforded capital gains treatment to the lump sum payment. There had, as yet, been
no production payments and therefore the court did not determine if these royalties, when
made, would require a different tax treatment. United States v. White, 311 F2d 399, 403
(10th Cir. 1962). The instant case arose when the Commissioner challenged the capital
gains treatment accorded the production payments.
2. White v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 894 (D. Colo. 1966).
3. 'Mineral interests can be capital assets, stock in trade, or property used in the taxpayer's trade or business. If they are capital assets, any sale results in capital gain or loss.
If they are stock in trade, any sale results in ordinary gain or loss. If they are real property used in the taxpayer's trade or business, they are Section 1231 lInt. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 1231) assets... . In sales of such assets held for more than six months, gains and losses
are set off against each other; a net gain is treated as a capital gain and a net loss is an
ordinary loss." Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation-Part II, 1 Land
& Water L. Rev. 379, 390 (1966). The present taxpayers had held the mineral interests as
capital assets; thus, a sale would have resulted in a capital gain or loss.
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 613.
5. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1201. If a transaction is accorded capital gains
treatment in no event will the tax exceed 25% of the long-term capital gain. If the transaction
is treated as a lease, however, the consideration will be treated as ordinary income, subject to
depletion. United States v. White, 401 F.2d 610, 612 (10th Cir. 1968). The ordinary income
tax rates for an individual are progressive and can be as high as 70% (not including the surcharge). If the lessor is a corporation the tax would be equal to 22% on the first $25,000 of
taxable income and 48% on taxable income in excess of $25,000 (not including the surcharge).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1, 11. The percentage depletion rates (which vary from 5% to
27Y2%) will usually not offset the advantage of capital gains treatment. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 613(b). See generally Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at 385.
6. See note 16 infra.
7. This disparity has developed even though the Internal Revenue Service has stated
that the tax laws should be applied uniformly in both areas. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum.
Bull. 214, 219.
8. Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); Burton-Sutton
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940);
Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933). For a complete discussion of the concept of the
"economic interest" see Sneed, The Economic Interest-An Expanding Concept, 35 Texas
L. Rev. 307 (1957).
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entitled to a depletion allowance,9 has subsequently been utilized to make the
sale-lease distinction.' 0 A taxpayer is said to have an "economic interest" wherever "the taxpayer has acquired, by investment, any interest in the oil in place,
and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the oil, to which he must look for a return of his capital."" If it is
found that the transferor has retained an "economic interest" the transfer is
denominated a lease and he is entitled only to the depletion allowance. Thus
one who reserves a royalty interest, that is, the right to receive a specified percentage of all minerals produced during the term of the lease,12 is deemed to
have an "economic interest"'13 and the consideration for the transfer will be
treated as ordinary income, subject to depletion. However, when faced with
similar transactions in the hard mineral area, the courts have not consistently
applied the "economic interest" test,14 though apparently only one court 15 has
explicitly found, without any specific reason, the test inapplicable to hard mineral transactions. Rather, many courts have merely relied on other criteria in
order to sustain hard mineral transactions as sales. 10
One can only speculate as to why the courts were loath to apply the "economic interest" doctrine to minerals other than oil and gas. Perhaps it was
9. The depletion allowance is "based on the theory that production of income may necessitate exhaustion of capital assets employed in that production....
... The purpose of the depletion deduction is to permit the owner of a capital interest in
mineral in place to make a tax-free recovery of that depleting capital asset. Absent an
interest in the mineral . . . in place, depletion is allowable only when a capital Investment
in production is returnable from the extraction of the mineral . . . ." 4 J. Mertens, Federal
Income Taxation 1124.02 (1966) (footnotes omitted). Thus, if after a transaction, the transferor still has a capital interest in the minerals in place or one which arises out of the
extraction of the minerals, he is entitled to depletion commensurate to his interest. If he has
no such interest remaining, he has completely disposed of or "sold" a capital asset and Is
entitled to capital gains treatment on the consideration from the sale. See Anderson v.
Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 408 (1940).
10. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
11. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933).
12. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 409 (1940).
13. The royalty interest, as defined above, is not the only type of "economic Interest."
For a full discussion and analysis of the various kinds of "economic interests" see C. Breeding & A. Burton, Income Taxation of Oil and Gas Production U12.09 (2d ed. 1961).
14. Of course there have been occasions where the courts have applied the test in the
hard mineral field to determine whether or not a sale had taken place. See Kittle v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 79 (1953), aff'd per curiam, 229 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1956); Albritton v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 903 (1955), aff'd, 248 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1957).
15. Barker v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957).
16. For a detailed discussion of the various cases in this area see Comment, Sale or
Lease? Disparate Tax Treatment of Mineral Transactions by Courts Based on Nature of
Minerals Involved, 42 Texas L. Rev. 707 (1964). "[Clourts have elected to rest their
decisions upon combinations of such nebulous indicia as the intent of the parties, the relative size of the initial payments as compared to the payments based upon production, the
absence of an obligation to drill or mine, the language used in the instrument of transaction,
the likelihood that all minerals will be produced and whether or not development and production was the primary purpose of the transaction." Id. at 711 (footnotes omitted).
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because of the disparity between the depletion allowance for oil and gas, which

is twenty-seven and one-half percent, and that for other minerals, which varies
from five (gravel) to twenty-three percent (sulfur and uranium).17 The original and primary use of the "economic interest" test was to ascertain who was
entitled to the depletion bonanza and only secondarily was it utilized to determine whether a given transaction was a sale or a lease for tax purposes. Thus,
in the sand and gravel cases, to deny capital gains treatment is almost to eliminate any tax advantage for an individual who holds the mineral as a capital
asset, since he would only have a depletion allowance of five percent.
The position of the Internal Revenue Service is very clear with respect to
tax treatment of all mineral transactions: "The Supreme Court has repeatedly
taken the position that where, in consideration of a lump-sum payment and
stipulated royalties payable out of production, a grantor extends to a grantee
a right to enter upon land for purposes of exploitation of the minerals therein,
the lump-sum payment constitutes an advance royalty, taxable as ordinary income, and not proceeds from a sale of a capital asset."' 8
The court in the instant case decided that it was impossible to afford different
tax treatment to two different aspects of the same transaction, 0 and adopted the
"economic interest" test for hard mineral transactions as well as those in the
oil and gas area. While this result may lead to some hardship to those possessed
of hard mineral rights, the court was correct in eliminating the artificial distinction which it and other courts have previously maintained. If depletion allowances need readjustment this should be done by Congress and not through contrived decisions in our courts.

Torts-Neglgence-Landowner May Be Liable to Trespassing Infant Injured by Volatile Fluid.-The plaintiff, twelve years old, and his brother, nine,

climbed a wall which fenced in three sides of an otherwise open yard owned by
the defendant and located adjacent to its plant. They were trespassers.1 The
plaintiff picked up a can of fluid which to all appearances was water, but which
actually contained a highly volatile paint solvent. In a subsequent game of

"fireman" the plaintiff was severely burned when he poured the solvent on a
fire they had started. The plaintiff's complaint was dismissed by the lower

courts, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "if the owner
of land leaves it open and accessible to children; if he knows that children use

it for play; and if he leaves accessible to them highly volatile substances, a case
prima facie is made out if a child is thus injured."- Patterson v. Proctor.Paint
& Varnish Co., 21 N.Y.2d 447, 235 N.E.2d 765, 288 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1968).
17. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 613(b).
18. G.C.M. 27322, 1952-2 Cum. Bull. 62, 63 (citations omitted).

19. The court reasoned that only one transaction had taken place and that this transaction could be either a sale or a lease. Once the nature of the transaction is determined,
the tax consequences flow therefrom.
1. Patterson v. Proctor Paint & Varnish Co., 21 N.Y.2d 447, 450, 235 N.E.2d 765, 766,
288 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (1968).

2. Id. at 453, 235 N.E.2d at 768, 288 N.YS.2d at 627.
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In landowner tort cases liability has been predicated upon the relationship of
the landowner to the injured party: that is, whether the injured party is an
invitee,3 licensee 4 or trespasser. 5 A trespasser is a person who, without permission or privilege, enters or remains upon the land of another.0 It is generally accepted that the only duty to a trespasser on the part of the landowner is to
refrain from intentionally or negligently injuring him." In some jurisdictions the
liability of a landowner to a trespassing adult differs from the liability to a
trespassing child, the liability to the latter being more comprehensive. 8 This increased liability was originally termed the "turntable doctrine,"0 derived from
Railroad Co. v. Stout,'0 where the Supreme Court, in holding the railroad liable
for the plaintiff's injury while playing on the defendant's unattended turntable,
said that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the
same rule which governs that of an adult."'"
This theory of increased liability to children has since acquired the name
3. A party on the land of another by invitation or on lawful business of interest to
both parties is an invitee. Vaughan v. Transit Dev. Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 118 N.E. 219 (1917).
For a discussion of the definition of an invitee see W. Prosser, Torts § 61 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as W. Prosser].
4. A licensee is a social guest on the premises of another. See Krause v. Alper, 4 N.Y.2d
518, 151 N.E.2d 895, 176 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1958); Drutman v. Agar, 17 Misc. 2d 291, 185
N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1959); W. Prosser, § 60. For a good discussion of the duties owed
to an invitee and a licensee see James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed
to Licensees and Invitees, 63 Yale L.J. 605 (1954).
5. See W. Prosser §§ 58-59; Annot., 36 A.L.R. 34 (1925); 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 489, 490
(1967). See also Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation,
68 Yale L.J. 633 (1959). Some courts use the name "bare licensee." In Morse v. Buffalo
Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. 110, 19 N.E.2d 981 (1939), the court held that the duty owed to a
bare licensee is the same as that owed to a trespasser; and, in Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Simons, 76 N.E. 883, 886 (Ind. App. Div. 1906), the court decided to treat the terms
synonymously.
6. Restatement of Torts § 329 (1934) ; Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 Temp.
L.Q. 32, 34-38 (1937). It is interesting to note that there is a trend away from determining
liability according to these common law classifications. See Rowland v. Christian, - Cal. 2d
-, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Potts v. Amis, 62 wash. 2d 777, 384 P.2d 825
(1963). The distinctions are not recognized in admiralty law. See Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
7. Carradine v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.2d 291, 196 N.E.2d 259, 246 N.Y.S.2d 620
(1963); Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R., 145 N.Y. 301, 39 N.E. 1068 (1895); Fauci v. Milano,
15 App. Div. 2d 939, 225 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2d Dep't 1962), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 926, 188
N.E.2d 525, 238 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1963); Stinnet v. Liberty Aircraft Prod. Corp., 273 App. Div.
909, 77 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d Dep't 1948).
8. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 427 (1959); Comment, Landowner's
Liability to Infant Trespassers: Status of the Law in New York, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 290
(1956); 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 251 (1934).
9. W. Prosser § 59, at 373.
10. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
11. Id. at 660. For a critical examination of Stout see Smith, Liability of Landowners to
Children Entering Without Permission (pts. 1-2), 11 Harv. L. Rev. 349, 434 (1898). For
federal court action on the turntable doctrine see Hudson, The Turntable Cases in the
Federal Courts, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 826 (1923).
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"attractive nuisance doctrine."' This doctrine places liability on a possessor of
land for an injury to a trespassing infant if he knows of the trespassing and
knows or should know of an unreasonable risk of serious injury which the
children do not realize, and if the utility to the possessor is less than the risk
of the injury.13 The reasons for the attractive nuisance doctrine are apparent:
"Children are vital to our way of life. Their physical welfare is worthy of the
law's protection."' 4 They lack the maturity and judgment to understand the
dangers of trespassing and
it is impractical to expect their parents to follow
15
them around as keepers.
At present, all but seven jurisdictions' 6 in the United States have accepted
the doctrine of attractive nuisance.' 7 It was, at first, accepted and applied in
New York' 8 in Mdllaney v. Spence; 19 later distinguished in McAlpin v. Powclr-0
by language expressing doubt as to the application of the principle; 2 'L and
finally, it was repudiated in Walsh v. FitchburgR.R.2 2 A plethora of New York
cases have followed the Walsh holding that there is no attractive nuisance
doctrine in New York.2 3 Despite this, however, "the spirit of the doctrine has
24
prevailed.1

12. For a discussion of the evolution of the name "attractive nuisance" see W. Prosser
§

59, at 372-73; Green, Landowners' Responsibility to Children, 27 Texas L. Rev. 1, 8
(1948).
13. Restatement of Torts § 339 (1934). Note that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339
(1965) adds the requirement that the possessor fail "to exercise reasonable care to eliminate
the danger or otherwise to protect the children." For a discussion of the requirements of the
Restatement, see generally James, supra note 4.
14. Green, supra note 12, at 12.
15. Prosser, supra note 8, at 429.
16. The seven jurisdictions are: Maine, Lewis v. Mains, 150 Me. 75, 104 A.2d 432 (1934);
Maryland, Conrad v. City of Takoma Park, 208 Md. 363, 118 A2d 497 (1955); Massachusetts, Urban v. Central Mass. Elec. Co., 301 Mass. 519, 17 N.E.2d 718 (1938); New Hampshire, Devost v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 79 N.H. 411, 109 A. 839 (1920); Ohio, Ware
v. City of Cincinnati, 93 Ohio App. 431, 111 N.E2d 401 (1952); Rhode Island, Houle v.
Carr-Consol. Biscuit Co., 85 RI. 1, 125 A.2d 143 (1956); and Vermont, Trudo v. Lazarus,
116 Vt. 221, 73 A.2d 306 (1950). New Hampshire is to be considered with caution
in light of a recent case, Lahore v. Davison Constr. Co., 101 N.H. 123, 133 A.2d 591 (1957).
Virginia and West Virginia have a doctrine of "dangerous instrumentalities" which is, in effect,
the same as attractive nuisance. See Washabaugh v. Northern Va. Constr. Co, 187 Va. 767,
48 S.E.Y2d 276 (1948) ; White v. Kanawha City Co., 127 W. Va. 566, 34 S.-.2d 17 (1945).
17. See generally W. Prosser § 59, at 373 & n.44.
18. Comment, supra note 8, at 294.
19. 15 Abb. Pr. (ns.) 319 (Brooklyn City CL N.Y. 1874).
20. 70 N.Y. 126 (1877).
21. See Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R., 145 N.Y. 301, 308, 39 N.E. 1068, 1070 (1895).
22. 145 N.Y. 301, 39 N.E. 1068 (1895).
23. See, e.g., Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. 110, 19 N.E.2d 981 (1939); Faud v.
Milano, 15 App. Div. 2d 939, 225 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2d Dep't 1962), afd mem, 12 N.Y.2d
926, 188 N.E.2d 525, 238 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1963); Dunnier v. Doolittle, 14 App. Div. 2d 179,
217 N.Y.S.2d 759 (3d Dep't 1961) ; Palladino v. Onondaga County Say. Bank, 253 App. Div.
929, 8 N.Y.S.2d 773 (4th Dep't 1938); Moriarty v. New York Cent. R.R., 124 N.Y.S.2d 284
(Sup. Ct. 1933); Dewar v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 49 N.YS.2d 654 (Sup. CL 1944).
24. 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 137, 141 (1900). ".Although the court [in Mayer v. Temple
Properties Inc., 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954)] reaffirmed its position that attractive
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In New York the landowner's duty is to abstain from willful or wanton acts
toward an adult trespasser. 25 It has long been accepted, however, as "a matter
of no uncertainty," that a distinction actually exists between the standard of
care to be exercised toward an adult and that to be exercised toward an infant. 20
There is no doubt, for example, that the New York courts apply an attractive
nuisance theory in cases involving public highways.27 In Tierney v. New York
Dugan Brothers, InC., 28 the court distinguished between an injury on a public

thoroughfare and one on private premises, holding that there may be liability
in the former situation but not in the latter because the children had no right
to enter a private premise.2 9 Courts have found liability in the latter situation
by interpreting the maintenance of an attraction upon one's land as an ex-

pressed or implied invitation, thus raising the standard of care to be exercised

by the landowner to that accorded an invitee.30 In Levine v. City of New

York, 31 an infant was injured while playing on a broken railing of the defen-

dant's stairway. The court held that the entire area adopted the characteristics

of a playground. The city, therefore, was under a greater duty of care than
would have been the case had there been no invitation to the people to congregate in the area with their children. 32 Although the instant defendant's yard
nuisance is not the law of New York, it is interesting to note that it stresses all but one
[that the utility to the possessor be less than the risk of injury) of the elements laid down
in section 339 of the Restatement of Torts." Comment, supra note 8, at 304. Despite Its rejection of attractive nuisance, New York has reached a similar position by demanding that
the "occupier abstain from affirmative acts of negligence toward the trespasser." The position after the 1954 decision in Mayer seems to be that "the maintenance of a dangerous
structure or operation without adequate protection and in a spot where the occupier knows
that trespassers may come, will in itself constitute affirmative negligence." Hughes, supra
note 5, at 640-41. See W. Prosser § 59, at 373 nA4; Thornton & McNiece, Torts, 31 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 344, 361-62 (1956); Thornton & McNiece, Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 30
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1621, 1627 (1955).
25. See cases cited note 7 supra.
26. 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 251 (1934); see Gloshinsky v. Bergan Milk Transp. Co., 279
N.Y. 54, 17 N.E.2d 766 (1938); O'Driscoll v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Misc. 372,
33 N.Y.S.2d 557 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
27. Boylhart v. DiMarco & Reimann, Inc., 270 N.Y. 217, 200 N.E. 793 (1936); Meyers v.
120th Ave. Bldg. Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 931, 195 N.Y.S.2d 163 (2d Dep't 1959), aff'd mem.,
11 N.Y2d 871, 182 N.E.2d 291, 227 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1962); Connell v. Berland, 223 App. Div.
234, 228 N.Y.S. 20 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 248 N.Y. 641, 162 N.E. 557 (1928); Eason v.
State, 201 Misc. 336, 104 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd mem., 280 App. Div. 358, 113
N.Y.S.2d 479 (1952); Gallagher v. Fordham & Loring Corp., 13 N.Y.S.2d 322 (New York
City Ct. 1939). Where a building has been condemned as a public nuisance, the attractive
nuisance theory may also be applied. Runkel v. Homelsky, 3 N.Y.2d 857, 145 N.E.2d 23,
166 N.Y.S. 2d 307 (1957).
28. 288 N.Y. 16, 41 N.E.2d 161 (1942).
29. Id. at 19, 41 N.E.2d at 162.
30. See, e.g., Bowers v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 282 N.Y. 442, 26 N.E.2d 970
(1940); Collentine v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 119, 17 N.E.2d 792 (1938); Green, supra
note 12, at 7; Prosser, supra note 8, at 434 n.37; Comment, supra note 8, at 297; 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 137, 142 (1900). Some jurisdictions use the invitation theory as the entire basis
for liability. See Annot., 36 A.L.R. 34, 114 (1925).
31. 309 N.Y. 88, 127 N.E.2d 825 (1955).
32. Id. at 92, 127 N.E.2d at 826.
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was in a residential area and known to be used by children at play, the court
did not find, or even consider, that it took on the characteristics of a "public
playground."
More often, however, a trespassing infant plaintiff has been allowed to
recover when his injury was caused by a dangerous instrumentality on the
defendant's land.3 3 The maintenance of a dangerous instrumentality has been

interpreted as the affirmative creation of a trap,34 and it has been held that this,
and not the theory of attractive nuisance, is the only basis for liability.m The
dangerous instrumentality cases have expanded the liability to infants on a case
by case basis to include injuries caused by explosives,3 fireworks, 37 high voltage
electrical apparatus,3 8 a building with a dilapidated roof,39 and, in the present
case, volatile substances. Not all substances, however, are considered dangerous
instrumentalities. Recovery has been denied, for example, in cases where the
2
alcohol,4 0 quicklime, 41 film strips,4 and an
injury was caused by denatured
43
iron grate in the street.

This rather stringent rule of limiting liability to inherently dangerous instrumentalities has been tempered by the courts' willingness to consider sundry
factors in determining what is inherently dangerous. One such factor to be
considered is the propensities of children. 44 In Bowers v. City Bank Farmers
33. E.g., Mayer v. Temple Properties Inc., 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954);
Kingsland v. Erie County Agricultural Soc'y, 298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949) ; Morse v.
Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. 110, 19 N.E.2d 981 (1939); French v. Central N.Y. Power
Corp., 275 App. Div. 238, 89 N.Y.S.2d 543 (4th Dep't 1949); Travell v. Bannerman, 71
App. Div. 439, 75 N.Y.S. 886 (2d Dep't 1902), rev'd on other grounds, 174 N.Y. 47, 66
N.E. 583 (1903); Prosser, supra note 8, at 434 n.37; Comment, supra note 8, at 295; 16
Buffalo L. Rev. 489, 490 (1967); 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 137, 141 (1900).
34. Mayer v. Temple Properties Inc., 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954). On facts
similar to Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R., 145 N.Y. 301, 39 N.E. 1068 (1895), the court held that
"the plaintiff was induced to come upon the defendant's turn-table by the defendant's own
conduct, and that, as to him, the turntable was a hidden danger, a trap." Keefe v. Milwaukee
& St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207, 210 (1875).
35. "The rule seems to be the thoroughly settled . . . that a plaintiff cannot recover in
cases of this character unless the article which causes the injury is inherently dangerous."
Beickert v. G.M. Laboratories, Inc., 242 N.Y. 168, 172, 151 N.E. 195, 196 (1926).
36. Pond v. Regis, 25 App. Div. 2d 917, 270 N.Y.S.2d 121 (3d Dep't 1966); Travell v.
Bannerman, 71 App. Div. 439, 75 N.Y.S. 866 (2d Dep't 1902).
37. Kingsland v. Erie County Agricultural Soc'y, 298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949).
38. French v. Central N.Y. Power Corp., 275 App. Div. 238, 89 N.Y.S.2d 543 (4th Dep't
1949).
39. Soto v. City of New York, 9 N.Y.2d 683, 173 N.E2d 238, 212 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1961).
40. Hall v. New York Tel. Co., 214 N.Y. 49, 108 N.E. 182 (1915). "[T]he alcohol, left

untouched by the boys, was not of necessity dangerous." Id. at 52, 108 N.E. at 182.
41. Beetz v. City of Brooklyn, 10 App. Div. 382, 41 N.YS. 1009 (2d Dep't 1896).
42. Beickert v. G.M. Laboratories, Inc., 242 N.Y. 168, 151 N.E. 195 (1926).
43. Cuevas v. 73rd & Cent. Park W. Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 239, 272 N.Y.S2d 41 (Ist
Dep't 1966), aff'd mem., 21 N.Y.2d 745, 234 N.E.2d 843, 287 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1968).
44. Levine v. City of New York, 309 N.Y. 88, 93, 127 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1955) ; Collentine
v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 119, 125, 17 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1938); Parnell v. Holland
Furnace Co., 234 App. Div. 567, 571, 256 N.Y.S. 323, 237 (4th Dep't 1932); O'Driscoll v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Misc. 372, 33 N.Y.S.2d 557 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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the court said that "[a]lthough it is true that the doctrine of
. . . the jury was 'entitled to
take into consideration the well-known propensities of children to climb about
and play.' "46 The significance of such a statement is readily discernible when one
realizes that "a recovery in the . . . [Bowers] case would seem to exceed the
liberality of those courts most strongly adhering to the 'attractive nuisance'
doctrine." 47 Considering this statement in conjunction with the court's holding
in Kingsland v. Erie County Agricultural Society 48 that "[t]he degree of care
required is commensurate with the risk involved, depending upon such circumstances as the 'dangerous character of the material' and its accessibility to
others, particularly children whose presence should have been anticipated, regardless of whether or not they are trespassers[ ,]" 49 the instant court has
taken a position analogous to that of the Restatement, which sets forth the
attractive nuisance doctrine.5 0
The present case is an essential step in the trend toward acceptance of
attractive nuisance by the New York courts. First, it brought within the orbit
of liability injuries caused by volatile substances under the circumstances
enumerated by the court.5 ' Second, it expressly disregarded, without overruling,52 Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp. 3 which had held that there was no attractive nuisance doctrine in New York, and that gasoline was not inherently
dangerous.
Although there are recent cases to the contrary,5 4 it is not unforeseeable that
New York will eventually recognize that it does in fact accept the doctrine of
attractive nuisance.55 Presently, liability is considered an exception to the rule
that there is no attractive nuisance in New York. However, exceptions so broad
as to include injuries on public highways, an implied invitation theory, and
injuries caused by substances, some of which are inherently dangerous, becomes
a rule in itself. A lower New York court indicated this in one case"0 by holding
that the jury should have been charged with the Restatement rule that the
possessor of land is liable for unreasonable, foreseeable injuries to infants. 7
attractive nuisance does not apply in this State

45. 282 N.Y. 442, 26 N.E.2d 970 (1940).
46. Id. at 446, 26 N.E.2d at 972.
47. 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 140, 141 n.1 (1941).
48. 298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949).
49. Id. at 423-24, 84 N.E.2d at 45.
50. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
51. 21 N.Y.2d at 453, 235 N.E.2d at 768, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
52. Id. at 452, 235 N.E.2d at 768, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
53. 280 N.Y. 110, 19 N.E2d 981 (1939). See text at note 23 supra.
54. Cuevas v. 73rd & Cent. Park W. Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 239, 272 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1st
Dep't 1966), aff'd mem., 21 N.Y.2d 745, 234 N.E.2d 843, 287 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1968).
55. In Popkin v. Shanker, 36 Misc. 2d 242, 232 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1962), the court
admitted that a lawn mower was not an inherently dangerous instrumentality but was not
prepared to say that the plaintiff could not advance a theory upon which there could be a

recovery.
56. Clifton v. Patroon Operating Corp., 271 App. Div. 122, 63 N.Y.S.2d 597 (3d Dep't
1946).
57. Id. at 130, 63 N.Y.S.2d at 603.

